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I. INTRODUCTION
In promulgating the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations (hereinafter “Family Dissolution
Principles” or “Principles”),1 the American Law Institute (ALI)
proposes an extensive set of new rules to apply in proceedings
relating to family dissolution. Among the subjects covered by the
ALI Principles are child custody (chapter 2), child support (chapter
3), property division (chapter 4), alimony (chapter 5), domestic
partnership (chapter 6), and antenuptial and pre-cohabitation
agreements (chapter 7). As the first proposal of any national legal
institution for general reforms of family dissolution law since the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”), which was
proposed more than thirty years ago,2 the Family Dissolution
Principles are both very timely and significant. The ALI is a
prestigious law reform organization that has sponsored many
successful law reform proposals during the past seventy-eight years.3
The Principles are the product of eleven years of labor by respected
law professor Reporters,4 who were advised by three dozen very
1. All references to provisions of chapters 6 and 7 and the comments and the
Reporter’s Notes thereto are to the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)].
2. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 1 (1998). The
UMDA, as it is known, was first approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1970 and was amended in 1971 and 1973. While it has been a law
teacher’s favorite, it has been less popular with state legislatures and was only adopted by eight
states (with some deviations from the UMDA in most of them); all eight states acted to adopt
the UMDA between 1972 and 1977. Id. (Table of Jurisdictions).
3. The ALI was founded in 1923 and has included many of America’s most influential
judges, lawyers, and law professors among its members since its founding. The ALI has
promulgated many highly influential “Restatements of the Law” in various fields of law
(including Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Torts, and Trusts, to name but a few), helped
in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, and drafted several influential model codes,
including the Model Penal Code and the Model Code of Evidence. See The American Law
Institute, at http://ali.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
4. The Chief Reporter was Ira Ellman, law professor at Arizona State University, lead
author of a highly regarded family law casebook, and a prolific family law scholar. He was
assisted by Katharine T. Bartlett, co-author of the same casebook, respected author of
significant articles about custody and children, as well as the Dean of Duke University School
of Law. Grace Ganz Blumberg of UCLA Law School and a respected authority on financial
issues relating to marital dissolution was the third Reporter. Marygold S. Melli, a highly
respected family law professor and prolific family law scholar from the University of Wisconsin
also served for a time as a Reporter and was later a consultant. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft
No. 4), supra note 1, at v.
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influential members of the legal profession, including a dozen highly
respected state court judges,5 and attended by several dozen other
knowledgeable and important lawyers, law professors, and judges.6
Thus, the Family Dissolution Principles has an impeccable pedigree,
and because many influential jurists, law professors, and bar leaders
helped to create it, it is certain to find a receptive audience in at least
some lawmaking, legal, and academic circles. Clearly, the ALI Family
Dissolution Principles must be taken very seriously as a significant law
reform proposal that could have a major impact upon family law in
America.
A. The ALI Proposal to Expand the Categories of Relationships
Accorded “Family” Legal Status and Benefits
While some of the principles incorporated in the Family
Dissolution Principles are quite familiar to practitioners and scholars
of family law, many of the proposals go far beyond existing law and
recommend radical changes in family laws and policies. Perhaps the
most revolutionary proposals would expand the types of relationships
that receive privileged “family” status and benefits. Most of the
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles contain provisions that
deconstruct, level, or redefine “family” relationships. For example,
many of the sections of chapter 2 (custody), chapter 5
(compensatory payments), chapter 6 (domestic partners), and
chapter 7 (agreements) contain provisions that either significantly
redefine currently protected family relations or radically alter existing
family law doctrines. Among the most disturbing of the proposed
leveling reforms are those in chapter 6 (domestic partners), where
the ALI proposes to significantly expand the types of relationships
that may claim the full economic protections and privileges of marital
status upon dissolution.
This article focuses on chapter 6 to demonstrate the familydeconstruction-and-relational-equalization theme of the ALI Family
Dissolution Principles and to show that the ALI Principles radically
redefine family by substantially expanding the categories of persons

5. Among the distinguished jurists who served as special advisers were Chief Justice
Shirley S. Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Joseph P. Warner of the
Massachusetts Appeals Court, and Judge Judith Mitchell Billings of the Utah Court of
Appeals. Id. at v–vi.
6. See id. at v–xii.
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and relationships that are given legal preference as “family”
relationships. Chapter 6 is predicated upon some erroneous
assumptions about the characteristics of same-sex and heterosexual
nonmarital cohabitation (as well as the nature and qualities of
marriage in general) and about the sameness of the economic
expectations and interdependence of nonmarital cohabitants and
marital couples. By broadly defining domestic partners, liberally
providing for how that status may be established, and proposing to
extend identical (full marital) economic benefits to domestic partners
upon dissolution, the ALI moves toward equalizing the legal status
of all adult domestic relationships and the economic consequences of
their dissolution.
Part I.B of this article provides a summary and overview of
chapter 6 (domestic partners) of the Family Dissolution Principles.
Part II notes some “good intentions” and laudable objectives of
chapter 6, such as protecting couples who have lived in actual
marriage-like relationships without the formal status of marriage and
removing the economic incentive (for men, at least) to enter into
nonmarital cohabitation relationships instead of marriages. Part III
reveals how those good intentions have gone awry in the details of
the particular provisions of chapter 6 and suggests how those
provisions may seriously weaken and undermine the institution of
marriage. Part IV shows that the major flaws of chapter 6 are not
merely inadvertent or accidental; the ideological bias against
marriage and marriage-based family relations is reflected in many
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles. Chapter 2 (custody),
chapter 5 (compensatory payments), and chapter 7 (agreements) also
contain provisions that significantly deconstruct and redefine family
relations. Those chapters manifest significant hostility against the
traditional family and against relationships established by kinship,
marriage, and marital adoption. This article concludes by lamenting
that the radicalism of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles
represents a lost opportunity for an influential organization to
provide responsible leadership by proposing reasonable, well-drafted
reforms in the area of family dissolution law.
B. An Overview of Chapter 6
Chapter 6, entitled “Domestic Partners,” is one of the shorter
chapters of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles, containing only six
black letter sections and just sixty pages of text, commentary, and
1194
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notes. It was not part of the original ALI project on the Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution and was added as the project drew to
completion.7 It defines “domestic partnership” as a new legal family
status, provides rules for how the new relationship is established, and
defines the legal benefits and obligations that result from the
establishment and dissolution of that new relationship.
Section 6.01 defines the scope of the chapter, which is to govern
the financial claims of any two unmarried persons “who for a
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life
together as a couple.”8 Chapter 6 applies only to financial claims
arising at the termination of the relationship,9 is subject to proper
written opt-out contracts,10 and may not be applied to “compromise
the marital claims” of the lawful spouse of a domestic partner.11
Section 6.02 defines the twin objectives of chapter 6: to provide
for “fair distribution of the economic gains and losses incident to
termination” of a domestic partnership relationship, and to protect
society “from social welfare burdens that should be borne” by
former domestic partners.12 This is to be achieved by allocating
property owned by either domestic partner in light of, inter alia,
“equitable claims . . . [arising] in consequence of the relationship,”13
and allocating financial losses (including via alimony) “according to
equitable principles.”14
Section 6.03 defines who are to be deemed “domestic partners”
and how that new legal status is to be established. There are three
levels of inclusion—three ways to establish domestic partnership.
Two involve legal presumptions: one irrebuttable and one
rebuttable. “In general, domestic partners are two persons of the
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a

7. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS, Introduction, at xiv (Proposed Final Draft, Part I, Feb. 14, 1997)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I)]; id. at 11–14.
8. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(1).
9. Id. Claims arising during the relationship and afterward for child support (and, of
course, for custody and visitation) are not covered by chapter 6. Id. § 6.01(4).
10. Id. § 6.01(3). The general requirement that the agreement be in writing is
contained in section 7.05(1). However, section 6.01(3) allows enforcement of contracts that
are otherwise “enforceable under applicable law.” Id.
11. Id. § 6.01(5).
12. Id. § 6.02(1), (2).
13. Id. § 6.02(1)(a).
14. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02(1)(b).
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significant period of time share a primary residence and a life
together . . . .”15 Couples are irrebutably presumed to be domestic
partners (“[p]ersons are domestic partners”) “when they have
maintained a common household . . . with their common child” for
a minimum continuous (but unspecified) period of time called the
“cohabitation parenting period.”16 Couples are rebuttably presumed
to be domestic partners if they are not related by blood or adoption
and have maintained a common household for a minimum
continuous (but unspecified) period of time called the “cohabitation
period.”17 If neither presumption applies, a party may still establish
domestic partnership by proving “that for a significant period of time
the parties shared a primary residence and a life together as a
couple.”18 This determination must be made in light of thirteen
categorical considerations described in the section, including oral
statements, commingled finances, economic dependency, specialized
roles, changes in the parties’ lives, naming beneficiaries, distinctive
relations, emotional and sexual intimacy, community reputation,
commitment or attempted marriage ceremony, joint procreation,
childrearing or adoption, and common household.19 The fact that
one or both of the parties is (or are) married to another (or others),
or that the parties could not otherwise legally be married to each
other (for example, consanguinity or incest laws would prohibit their
marriage or sexual union) is no bar to finding that he, she, or they
are also domestic partners.20
Section 6.04 defines domestic partnership property as property
that would have been marital property had the parties been married
to each other “during the domestic-partnership period.”21 However,
15. Id. § 6.03(1); see also id. § 6.01(1) (“Domestic partners are two persons of the same
or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a
primary residence and a life together as a couple, as determined by § 6.03.”).
16. Id. § 6.03(2) (first emphasis added). The amount of time in the cohabitation
parenting period is undetermined in the Principles but is to be set in a “uniform rule of
statewide application.” Id. However, in the comments, a two-year period is used to illustrate
the point. Id. cmt. d; see also illus. 3, 7–8.
17. Id. § 6.03(3). The amount of time in the cohabitation period is undetermined in the
Principles but is to be set in a “uniform rule of statewide application.” Id. However, in the
comments, a period of three years is used to illustrate the point. See id. cmt. d & illus. 4–6.
18. Id. § 6.03(6).
19. Id. § 6.03(7)(a)–(m).
20. Id. § 6.03(7)(k) & cmt. d; id. § 6.01(5) & cmts. c–d.
21. Id. § 6.04(1). This period begins when the parties conceive a child or begin sharing
a primary residence and lasts until they cease sharing a primary residence. Id. § 6.04(2).
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recharacterizing separate property as domestic-partnership property
is not allowed.22
Section 6.05 provides that “[d]omestic-partnership property
should be divided according to the principles set forth for the
division of marital property . . . .”23 In other words, domestic
partners enjoy exactly the same property division claims and rights as
married couples.
Likewise, section 6.06 provides that “a domestic partner is
entitled to compensatory payments [alimony] on the same basis as a
spouse.”24 Again, with one minor exception, the economic benefit
provided to domestic partners is identical to that given to married
couples.25
Overall, chapter 6 provides that persons who live together for a
minimum period, or at least one of whom has experienced some
change of life “fostered” or “wrought” by their cohabitation, and
those who have expressly so contracted, comprise a domestic
partnership. As such, they are entitled to the same economic benefits
and incur the same economic obligations upon dissolution as
attributed by law to married couples.
II. THE “GOOD INTENTIONS” OF CHAPTER 6
Since chapter 6 is an example of some apparently good intentions
gone awry, it is appropriate to begin by noting the apparently good
intentions or objectives. Five laudable goals or restrictions are
particularly noteworthy.
First, one goal of chapter 6 is to provide financial protection for
economically dependent or loss-suffering parties to long-lasting
nonmarital cohabitation relationships that are truly marriage-like in
quality and characteristics who made no express agreement about
financial consequences.26 The abundant case law regarding common
law marriages, putative spouses, and some equitable remedies reveals
that some parties enter into marriage-like relationships with
22. Id. § 6.04(3).
23. Id. § 6.05.
24. Id. § 6.06(1)(a).
25. The only (minor) exception is that care of a child for whom the partner is not a legal
parent or parent by estoppel cannot provide the sole basis of a claim for compensatory
payment. Id. § 6.06(2).
26. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01; id. § 6.02
cmt. a.
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reasonable expectations that they really are (or are the same as)
marriages, including expectation of financial protections associated
with marriages.27 Chapter 6 would provide significant economic
protection for parties who have developed real, long-term, marriagelike relationships, but who have never been properly married. The
goal of protecting the financial interests or financial equity of
individuals who enter into such relationships is similar to the policy
underlying common law marriage, putative spouse, and equitable
doctrines (like unjust enrichment) and certainly is laudable.
Second, the drafters of chapter 6 clearly intend to give parties an
incentive to marry by removing the economic opportunity to get
“free milk” without marriage.28 By removing an opportunity to
circumvent financial responsibility for a partner in a marriage-like
relationship, chapter 6 can be seen as pro-marriage.29
Third, chapter 6 rejects the formal registration of domestic
partnerships. It thus differs from the approach taken by the Vermont
Legislature, which enacted a “Civil Union” registration scheme30
pursuant to the Vermont Supreme Court mandate that the
legislature extend equally the legal protections of marriage to samesex couples.31 By contrast, domestic partnership under chapter 6 is
merely a retrospective status, operative only after the relationship has
ended.32 Since no formalization is required or expected at the outset,
domestic partnership under chapter 6 does not resemble the creation
of marriage. That avoids one potentially objectionable concern about

27. See, e.g., Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (awarding social security
benefits to woman as common law spouse of man with whom she lived in New York for
twenty-one years as his wife); Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973)
(addressing situation of ceremonial marriage in good faith belief of validity by wife followed by
seven years living as husband and wife); Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O’Leary, 328 F.2d
877 (9th Cir. 1964) (discussing experience of cohabitation for twenty-three years, including
eighteen after prior marriage dissolved, and three children); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204 (Ill. 1979) (dealing with couple who lived as man and wife for fifteen years and had three
children).
28. A Scandinavian neighbor told my wife and me of a close friend of hers who was
cohabiting in her homeland with her boyfriend. She warned her friend several times that she
was putting her boyfriend in the situation of asking himself, “Why pay for a cow when I am
getting free milk?” After years of cohabitation, our neighbor’s friend was “dumped” by her
boyfriend, who decided to marry a younger woman.
29. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. b.
30. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2001).
31. Baker v. Virginia, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
32. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03.
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confusing or equating domestic partnership formation with marriage
formation.
Fourth, chapter 6 extends only limited benefits to domestic
partners. The benefits are limited in two ways. First, only parties to
the domestic partnership incur economic benefits or burdens from
the relationship. Chapter 6 does not extend rights or obligations to
or from third persons or the state.33 Likewise, the benefits available
under chapter 6 are only available upon termination of the
relationship during the lifetime of the parties.34 They do not apply
during the relationship, nor does chapter 6 deal with inheritance or
succession. Limiting the scope of benefits that flow from the status
of domestic partnership is prudent and appealing.35
Fifth, chapter 6 also provides that domestic partner claims
against a married domestic partner cannot be recognized if they
“compromise the marital claims of a domestic partner’s spouse.”36
The Reporters emphasize that the married spouse of the domestic
partner takes priority over the unmarried domestic partner.37
For these goals and provisions, the ALI deserves credit for its
good intentions. However, the good intentions that underlie chapter
6 of the ALI Family Dissolution Principles have gone awry. They are
offset and overwhelmed by flawed, sometimes radical provisions;
these are discussed in the next section.
III. GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: THE DECONSTRUCTION AND
REDEFINITION OF MARITAL STATUS
The problems with chapter 6 of the Family Dissolution Principles
are twofold. First, chapter 6 goes far beyond the intentions and goals
noted above. Those good intentions are rendered meaningless by
some of the radical provisions that broadly define domestic
partnership, set low standards for domestic partner determinations,
and equate nonmarital cohabitation with marriage. The remedies
33. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a.
34. Id. §§ 6.01(1), 6.02(1).
35. However, the absence of any principled explanation justifying these limitations is
troubling. See infra Part III.F.1.
36. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(5).
37. Id. § 6.01 cmt. c. Thus, both the spouse and a subsequent domestic partner may
recover financial claims against a married man who has both a wife and a partner. “The result
may be that the person involved in both relationships ends up with little or no property.” Id. at
7.
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provided are stunningly excessive and inappropriate, simply imported
wholesale from marriage law rather than tailored to the
characteristics of domestic partnerships. Second, a number of
problems arise relating to how chapter 6 would accomplish the
“good intentions” and objectives noted in Part II. Many provisions
are overbroad, loose, and ambiguous. Key sections of chapter 6 are
poorly drafted, evading critical policy issues and inviting judicial
legislation to fill in the large interstices in the vague provisions.
Moreover, chapter 6 ignores and fails to build upon, reasonably
develop, and expand existing legal doctrines.
The most significant flaws of chapter 6 of the ALI Family
Dissolution Principles can be grouped into eight categories. They are
described below.
A. The Provisions Defining “Domestic Partners” Are Overbroad
The definition of “domestic partners” is extremely broad and
overinclusive, exceeding the reasonable expectations of marriage or
marriage-like economic interdependence. Its breadth will invite
litigation and encourage the assertion of domestic partnership claims
in cases when there is no just basis for them. Two unmarried people
are deemed to be domestic partners and subject to the provisions of
chapter 6 if “for a significant period of time [they] share a primary
residence and a life together as a couple.”38 The requirement that
they cohabit for “a significant time” and that they have lived “as a
couple” are so subjective as to invite judges to simply resort to
personal preferences in deciding the issue.
The definition of domestic partners in chapter 6 is so broad that
it could include persons who did not intend to intermingle their
economic lives or incur any financial support or property sharing
obligations. Arguably, it could even include persons who actually
and demonstrably intend not to intermingle their economic lives or
incur any financial support or property sharing obligations. Any two
people unmarried to each other who live together as a couple in a
primary residence for a significant time and who do not explicitly and

38. Id. § 6.03 (1); see also id. § 6.01(1). During the discussions at the May 2000 plenary
meeting of the ALI, at which chapter 6 was approved, there was some suggestion that
language be added to limit this definition to those who were eligible to have the relationship
recognized as a marriage. In general, suggestions of that nature were rejected by the Reporters,
but it remains to be seen how the final definition will be crafted.
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properly agree not to be domestic partners may nevertheless be
found to be domestic partners.39
Persons involved in relationships that are against public policy,
including those that are prohibited by criminal law, would still
apparently qualify for financial benefits as domestic partners if the
parties are not married and live together as a couple for the requisite
period of time. Presumably, this would include relationships of
incest, concubinage, adultery, polygamy,40 and arguably even sexual
relationships involving parties who are not old enough to get
married. Even if one of the parties is married to someone else, that
person may be both a spouse and a domestic partner with an
adulterous paramour, concubine, mistress, or with multiple lovers at
the same time. The Reporters specifically provide that claims may be
asserted even if “one or both of the domestic partners were married
to someone else” unless that would “compromise the marital claims”
of the legal spouse.41 Incestuous relations are explicitly included.42
Chapter 6 specifically extends domestic partnership status and
benefits to same-sex couples.43 Thus, in the name of economic
morality, chapter 6 deliberately ignores many other moral concerns.
In chapter 6, the only morality that matters is economic.
B. Domestic Partnership Is Too Easy to Establish Under Chapter 6
The broad definition of “domestic partners” in chapter 6 might
be relatively harmless if it were offset by carefully drafted standards
governing how domestic partnership is to be proven in court.
Regrettably, however, chapter 6 is designed to make it extremely
easy to establish “domestic partnership.”

39. Id. § 6.03(1) & cmt. b.
40. In the discussions at the ALI May 2000 annual meeting, one Reporter suggested
that polygamy was not intended to be included. But it was not textually excluded at that time.
41. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01(5).
42. The drafters of chapter 6 considered and explicitly rejected the exclusion from
benefits of domestic partnership couples whose relationship would be incestuous and illegal,
even criminal. Thus, even the phrase “[p]ersons not related by blood or adoption” appears in
section 6.03(3). To narrow the class of persons who may benefit from a particular
presumption, the Reporters emphasize: “Its inclusion in Paragraph (3) is not intended to
exclude partners related by blood or adoption from the coverage of this Chapter.” Id. § 6.03
cmt. d, at 22.
43. Id. §§ 6.01(1), 6.03(1).
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1. Domestic partnership is too easy to establish by presumption
Section 6.03 establishes strong presumptions that make it
extremely easy to obtain the benefits of domestic partnership
provided by chapter 6. The presumptions will be dispositive in most
cases. If the couple are not related by blood or adoption, they “are
presumed to be domestic partners when they have maintained a
common household . . . for a continuous [amount of time] . . .
called the cohabitation period.”44 Regardless of their relationship
(even including persons related by blood or adoption), if two people
have maintained a common household with a common child for a set
period of time, the presumption that they are domestic partners is
irrebuttable.45
The two presumptions of section 6.03 are drafted very broadly
and are intended to apply in most cases. The Reporters note that
“detailed inquiry into the lives of couples to determine whether they
are domestic partners . . . will normally not be necessary, because
most cases will be decided under one of the two rules
[presumptions] set forth in Paragraphs (2) and (3).”46 Thus, chapter
6 is extremely pro-domestic partnership. In an apparent effort not to
exclude any possible just claimant, chapter 6 goes overboard in
including as domestic partners many who would have no just claim
or reasonable expectations of an economic partnership akin to
marriage.
2. Chapter 6 makes it too easy to establish domestic partnership even
without the benefit of the presumptions
In contrast to other chapters of the Family Dissolution
Principles,47 chapter 6 actually expands dramatically the discretion of
the court to find domestic partnership and encourages judges to
exercise that broad discretion in favor of finding couples to be
domestic partners. If a person claiming to be a domestic partner does
not qualify for the benefit of either the rebuttable or irrebuttable
44. Id. § 6.03(3).
45. Id. § 6.03(2).
46. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d.
47. That stands in stark contrast to the anti-discretion principle that generally
characterizes the Family Dissolution Principles. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field
Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
2001 BYU L. REV. 923.
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presumption, the party claiming to have been a domestic partner has
only the ordinary civil case burden “of proving that for a significant
period of time the parties shared a primary residence and a life
together as a couple.”48 In reaching a decision, the court must
consider a laundry list of thirteen factors to determine whether the
couple “shared life together as a couple” and thus qualify as
domestic partners.49 To give judges discretion to find in favor of
domestic partnership limited only by a sweeping list of thirteen
factors is to give them virtually unbridled discretion and a biased
(pro-partnership) disposition.
Section 6.03(7), listing the thirteen specific factors and
circumstances that the courts should consider in determining
whether or not a relationship qualifies for domestic partner status,
calls for extensive, close, factual scrutiny to make a determination.
This contradicts the Reporters’ assertion that they have crafted
section 6 to avoid individualized inquiries.50 The discretion to find
domestic partnership on the basis of thirteen factors—even when
there is no presumption because of inadequate time of cohabitation
or lack of a common child—seems to be tilted to encourage the
court to find domestic partnership.
The overall approach of section 6.03 is to “ascertain whether the
parties conducted themselves as spouses normally do in the course of
family life.”51 The standard may sound benign, but the
implementation is not. Despite the Reporters’ comments that
persons who are merely sharing a dwelling and not sharing their lives
are not covered,52 the distinction is extremely elusive. For example,
college roommates ordinarily do not intend to enter into marriagelike “domestic partner” relationships with each other, but that may
not be so apparent to a trier of fact. College roommates often spend
a lot of time with each other and support each other emotionally
(when report cards reveal disappointing grades, when job interviews
do not lead to summer employment offers, when family members
die, etc.). They often commingle expenses such as utility and phone
bills, they frequently share food, and may even cook and eat

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(6).
Id. § 6.03(7).
Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
Id. § 6.03 cmt. e, at 27.
Id. § 6.03 cmt. i, illus. 15–17.
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together. They may visit each other’s families during vacation
periods, they may go on Spring Break together, share cars,
computers, cooking utensils and clothes with each other, and
sometimes “bail each other out” when credit card or rent payments
are due. In fact, long-time college roommates could rather easily be
found to be “domestic partners” under chapter 6. If a sexual
relationship is added to the above facts, it is almost certain that
under chapter 6 the college roommates would be found to be
“domestic partners,” which could raise serious public policy
incongruity.53
Ironically, the drafters of chapter 6 exclude from coverage and
any economic protection the long-time, financially dependent
mistress or paramour whose wealthy lover visits her regularly in the
apartment he provides for her, but who does not normally reside
with her.54 Apparently she is to be excluded because the drafters
curiously believe that a reasonable expectation of financial support
cannot arise in the absence of cohabitation in a joint primary
residence, even if one party is being entirely supported by, and living
in a house provided by, the other. Apparently, sharing the primary
residence is the drafters’ exclusive litmus test for reasonable
expectations of economic sharing.
C. Chapter 6 Provides Economic Recovery Solely as a Matter of
Status—The New Legal Status of Domestic Partnership
Chapter 6 provides for economic rights for domestic partners
solely as a matter of status, as an incident of the status of domestic
partnership. It rejects contract and reasonable expectation as the
controlling principles for extension of financial protection to
nonmarital domestic partners, in favor of status. In this regard it goes
far beyond existing palimony law. Chapter 6 “relies, as do the
marriage laws, on a status classification” as the basis for the legal
imposition of economic obligations and claims between nonmarital
53. If, on the same facts but in the absence of sexual relations, a domestic partnership
were not found, that would raise the incongruous policy dilemma of “rewarding” parties who
engage in behavior that is contrary to public policy (extramarital sexual relations) but not
extending the same legal status and benefits to parties whose economic and nonsexual
interpersonal relations are otherwise entirely identical.
54. “The purpose is to exclude casual and occasional relationships, as well as extramarital
relationships conducted by married persons who continue to reside with a spouse.”
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. c & illus. 1–2.
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cohabitants.55 Thus, it creates a new “domestic status”—a new family
status in the law. It equates that new family status with marriage
both generally, as an equivalent status, and specifically, as entitled to
exactly the same fully equal marital rights to property sharing and to
support (alimony) after the termination of the relationship. As the
Reporters put it, “This approach reflects a judgment that it is usually
just to apply, to both groups [married couples and non-married
cohabitants who qualify as domestic partners], the property and
support rules applicable to divorcing spouses . . . .”56 In other words,
chapter 6 is based on the policy assumption that cohabitation is the
essence of marriage and nonmarital couples who cohabit should
receive the same economic benefits upon dissolution as married
couples.
The new “status” created by chapter 6 is a modern version of
what was called in civil law “concubinage.” Concubinage gave (and
in Louisiana today still gives) certain legal status and economic rights
to unmarried partners, especially (but not exclusively) mistresses of
married men.57
Concubinage, in some form, has existed since early recorded
history as far back as the Book of Genesis.58 During the Roman
Empire, concubinage was widely recognized, but only existed as an
inferior or secondary status to marriage, and was afforded only
certain types of legal recognition.59 The Roman concubine was a
female cohabitor who never acquired the social or legal status of her
male partner nor did the children of such a union.
Concubinage was acceptable even for married men but was
distinguished from casual love affairs because of its more permanent
nature. It continued as a recognized institution in Rome until
Emperor Constantine forbade it; subsequent Christian emperors
condemned the practice and it fell into disuse.
Concubinage, in Louisiana law as in ancient times, has

55. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b, at 19.
56. Id.
57. In recent years, there has been significant debate over whether persons of the same
sex can have a concubinage relationship. Most courts have rejected the proposition. See
Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Dial v. Dial, 636 N.E.2d
361 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991);
but see In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
58. Gen. 35:22.
59. Badillo v. Tio, 6 La. Ann. 129 (La. 1851)
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traditionally been viewed as a union between a man and a woman,
living together as husband and wife but outside of marriage. Unlike
marriage, it is not a civil contract and lacks the formalities required
by our civil code.60 It differs from putative marriage in that the
parties have no reasonable belief that they are married.61
In chapter 6 the ALI resurrects concubinage in an expanded,
more profitable form and calls it domestic partnership.
The problem with creating a new domestic status is that it could
undermine the institution of marriage, which has been the exclusive
domestic relationship of adults in Anglo-American law for centuries.
Unmarried persons have been able to obtain economic justice upon
various legal and equitable doctrines including express and implied
contract, unjust enrichment, etc., but under those doctrines recovery
is not dependent upon and does not connote any domestic status.
Concerns about the impact of competing domestic status institutions
are one important reason why the status of concubinage has not
been generally accepted in common law states, and why it has been
abolished in most states with civil law histories.62 The effect of
creating an official, alternative, concubinage-like status of domestic
partnership could be just as damaging to the institution of marriage
as recognition of concubinage. This issue was not considered by the
ALI, and chapter 6 should not be adopted in any state until that
matter has been carefully examined and until it is clear that creating
domestic partnership will not detrimentally impact the integrity of
60. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 86 & 88 (1993).
61. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 117; Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1127–28. See generally
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Proposal For a More Perfect
Union, 26 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1980).
62. See generally Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000) (reviewing reasons for rejection of common law marriage
and concubinage); Stuart J. Stein, Common Law Marriage: Its History and Certain
Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAM. L. 271, 276–77 (1969) (presenting history and criticism of
common law marriage); cf. Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So. 2d 975, 977 (Ala. 1978) (“[I]n
modern society many individuals realize that common law marriages have inherent legal
problems not found in ceremonial marriages.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement,
107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998) (reviewing history of rejection of heartbalm actions because of
abuses); see also Harry D. Krause, Essay, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same
Sex—Or Not at All, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 298 (2000) (citing Mary Ann Glendon comparing
nonmarital cohabitation to French concubinage). Perhaps the Reporters were implementing
the advice of two feminists who have proposed that “concubinage” contracts be legalized to
compensate women for their unmarried sexual relationships with men, and that the economic
valuation of wives’ housework be increased by including sexual relations. See LINDA R.
HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 280–83 (1998).
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the institution of marriage.
The use of status as the basis for recovery is dependent upon an
assumption about the nature of cohabitation relationships that is
seriously flawed and factually erroneous. Chapter 6 assumes that
parties who cohabit outside of marriage in a shared primary residence
wish to and in fact do “enjoy [the] substance” of marriage without
the outward form.63 In fact, many people enter into nonmarital
cohabitation to avoid marriage, particularly to avoid the economic
responsibilities and obligations of marriage.64 And the assumption
that cohabitation is equivalent to marriage, even when that is
intended, is very dubious.65
D. The Remedies Provided by Chapter 6 Are Excessive and
Inappropriate
1. The economic benefits conferred by chapter 6 are unprecedented
The economic benefits conferred by chapter 6 are
unprecedented, going far beyond those conferred upon nonmarital
cohabitants under the most liberal existing palimony law. Section
6.04 extends to domestic partners full and equal marital property
rights upon dissolution. All property acquired during domestic
partnership that would be deemed marital property if the parties had
been married is divided between the domestic partners, and the
parties have the exact same post-relational claims to such property
(called “domestic partnership property”) as they would have if they
had fully and lawfully married.66 Section 6.05 provides that upon
termination of a domestic partnership the parties are entitled to the
same division of property that they would have enjoyed if they had
married. Section 6.06 provides that domestic partners are entitled to
the same compensatory payments (alimony) that married couples
may claim. The Reporters candidly admit that the provision for
support goes further than any state statute and nearly all state court
rulings have gone.67 In fact, the remedies provided are excessive
because the property interest provided to domestic partners is not
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a, at 11.
The Reporters know this. See id. § 6.02 cmt. b.
See infra Parts III.D.2–3, III.G.
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.04 (1).
Id. § 6.06, Reporter’s Notes, at 59–60.
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tailored to, and does not, provide fairness in relation to the kind of
relationship or economic reliance and expectations associated with
nonmarital cohabitation.
2. Chapter 6 does not tailor the remedy or protection extended to
domestic partnerships to the characteristics of those relationships, but
mechanically extends to domestic partners the same property rights that
married couples have in marital property
The biggest single flaw of chapter 6 is that it fails to create rights
and remedies that are customized for domestic partnership; it
extends exactly the same economic property interests and
compensatory rights to domestic partners as are provided to couples
who are in the much more significant, committed, economically
interdependent relationship of marriage. Marital property interests
are based on the time-verified fact that most parties who marry make
a long-term (presumably life-long) commitment to share their lives
and their total family and personal interests, and they make
significant adjustments in their economic life based on those
interdependency commitments. However, it is far from clear that
most nonmarital couples have similar expectations and make similar
sacrifices in reliance on their expectations. Indeed, the existing social
science evidence points in exactly the opposite direction, indicating
that parties living in nonmarital cohabitation have very different
expectations and characteristics than parties who are married.68 In
the face of the overwhelming evidence of such significant differences,
chapter 6 irrationally extends full, equal marital property and
compensatory payment rights to domestic partners.
In some jurisdictions, domestic partners (possibly called “de
facto couples” or something else) already are given limited economic
protections.69 The drafters of chapter 6 might have followed those
models and provided that domestic partners are entitled to one-half
(or some other proportion) of the property rights enjoyed by a
married person, or a certain interest per year over time (less than
68. See infra Parts III.D.2–3, III.G.
69. See, e.g., Reg Grayear & Jenni Millbank, The Bride Wore Pink . . . to the Property
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act of 1999: Relationships Law Reform in New South
Wales, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227 (2000); see also Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/Public Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 105 (2001)
(“[O]pposite-sex cohabitation generally does not create joint rights to property acquired
during the relationship.”).
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enjoyed by married persons). But the ALI chose instead to grant full
equivalent economic rights to domestic partners inter se.
Chapter 6 assumes that parties who cohabit generally, and all
who would meet the definition or be found to be “domestic
partners,” merely wish to “avoid the form of marriage even as they
enjoy its substance.”70 While empirical research indicates that young
people today “strongly endorse cohabitation, perhaps in the
mistaken belief that it will provide divorce insurance,”71 research
shows that “[b]oth the general public and cohabitors themselves
typically make a sharp distinction between marriage and
[cohabitation].”72 They believe that “[c]ohabitation is not ‘just like
marriage’ but . . . [a] lifestyle with a different set of social meanings,
which generally serves different purposes. . . . [Cohabitors] flaunt
their differences [from marriage].”73 While the minority of
cohabitors who have “definite plans to marry [such as cohabiting
fiancés] act and behave in ways that are similar to married couples,”
the rest (most) are “without plans to marry [and they] look very
different from married couples—in their health habits, in the way
they spend their money, in the attitudes toward divorce and
marriage, leisure and money, and in their fertility patterns.”74
Moreover, the financial expectations of parties who cohabit differ
markedly from persons who marry. The Reporters baldly assumed
that the economic expectations of cohabiting couples are the same as
the expectations of married couples.75 In fact, many people enter into
70. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a.
71. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 183 (2000).
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id.
74. Id. Apparently in only a minority of cohabiting couples do both parties intend to
marry; most cohabitations end in two years, and most do not result in marriage. Renata Forste,
Prelude to Marriage or Alternative to Marriage? A Social Demographic Look at Cohabitation in
the U.S., at 4 (Feb. 3, 2001) (In the 1980s, sixty percent of cohabitants married; in the 1990s,
only thirty-five percent marry).
75. The Reporters assume that “as in marriage” nonmarital cohabitants “‘intend to deal
fairly with each other.’” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b, at
19. While that may be true, what is “deal[ing] fairly with each other” when parties are merely
cohabiting is not necessarily the same as what is dealing fairly with each other when parties are
married. The Reporters believe that “as in marriage, in the ordinary case [of domestic
partnership] the law should provide remedies at the dissolution of a domestic relationship that
will ensure an equitable allocation of accumulated property and of the financial losses arising
from the termination of the relationship.” Id. Again, it may be true that an equitable allocation
should be provided upon termination of both marriages and long-term cohabitations, but what
is equitable is not necessarily the same. Economic equity upon breakup of the relationship
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nonmarital cohabitation to avoid marriage and particularly seek to
avoid the economic responsibilities and obligations of marriage. Fear
of the economic consequences of failure of a marriage is a major
reason for people cohabiting as domestic partners rather than
entering marriage.76 Thus, the extension in chapter 6 of exactly the
same post-relationship property sharing rights and continuing
support benefits to domestic partners as are provided to persons who
have been married is indefensible and excessive. It appears to be
more of a windfall—a reward for people who have entered into
politically correct, preferred nonmarital relationships—than an
accurate reflection of actual expectations or economic realities of
those relationships.
3. Chapter 6 endorses and establishes false equivalence to marriage
Because the remedy provided upon dissolution is exactly the
same, the standard and principles for granting recovery are exactly
the same, and presumably the amount of recovery awarded will be
exactly the same for domestic partners as for persons who have been
married, the message of chapter 6 is that domestic partnership status
is equivalent to marriage as an economic union. Nowhere in the
Family Dissolution Principles do the Reporters provide any evidence
to support that belief, and the common experience of history and
contemporaries is the opposite.77 Chapter 6 also sends uncritically a
message that nonmarital cohabitation of almost any two persons
(same-sex partners, incestuous partners, adulterous partners, and all
other nonmarital cohabitants) is just as valuable to society, just as
important to protect and encourage in law, as marriage. That is
neither supported nor supportable. Chapter 6 clearly conveys a
message of relationship equivalence that is not only demonstrably
false, but is dangerously deceptive.
The provisions of chapter 6 that prescribe economic remedies

clearly depends upon more than the amount of time the parties have lived with each other; it
depends also upon the nature and characteristics of the relationship, the understandings and
reliances of the parties, the allocation of responsibilities during the relationship, the assets,
work, income, saving and spending histories and patterns of the parties, etc. The Reporters,
however, categorically equate marriage and nonmarital cohabitation for economic purposes
upon dissolution. Id.
76. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on NonMarital Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275, 325.
77. See infra Part III.G.2.
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assume several dubious propositions. First, they assume that the
nature and characteristics of those “alternative relationships” are
essentially “the same as” traditional marital relationships. Second,
they assume that the benefits conferred upon society by those
relationships are just as valuable or equivalent to the benefits
conferred upon society by traditional marital relationships. Third,
they assume that the cost to society of conferring equivalent legal
protections is no greater than costs associated with the conferral of
legal status, benefits, and protections upon traditional marital
relations. Fourth, they assume that the kinds of benefits, protection,
status, and privileges conferred upon the alternative relationships
should be exactly the same for domestic partners as those conferred
upon traditional marriages, rather than customized and tailored to
the unique contours of the particular relationship. The net effect of
these assumptions and of chapter 6 is the deconstruction of marriage
by the myth of false equivalence.
By making domestic partnership a marriage-like “status” with
equivalent financial rights inter se, the ALI creates a competing
domestic status and sends a false message about functional
equivalence of domestic partnership and marriage.78 Thus, chapter 6
threatens the integrity and legal preference and protection for
marriage by equating domestic partnership with marriage for
purposes of property allocation and support claims upon dissolution.
E. Chapter 6 Fails to Use or Improve Existing
Legal and Equitable Doctrines
Chapter 6 largely overlooks and ignores existing legal and
equitable doctrines that have long proven useful to remedy the
problem of economic injustice resulting from the breakup of
significant marriage-like long-term relationships. Such doctrines and
remedies include the unjust enrichment doctrine, quantum meruit,
the putative spouse doctrine, doctrines of implied contract and
implied partnership, constructive trust principles, etc. Instead of
proposing to carefully fine-tune and develop existing legal and
equitable doctrines, chapter 6 proposes to create a radically new legal
status that is virtually unprecedented in American family law. This
seems rather like using a guillotine to get rid of a severe case of

78. See supra Part III.D.2–3; infra Part III.G.
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dandruff; there is no need to lose one’s head to solve the problem.
The Reporters acknowledge that existing doctrines are sufficient
to provide recovery in many cases.79 Of course, there are always cases
in which courts do not interpret or juries do not apply existing
equitable doctrines to everyone’s satisfaction. However, that will
happen even under the Family Dissolution Principles; our legal
system, judges, and juries will still be imperfect. The Reporters failed
to show why their rules will not be subject to just as much abuse as
existing rules and doctrines, or improved versions of them.
The inadequacy of existing legal and equitable doctrines to
provide an adequate remedy under new social conditions may well
justify a thorough and careful examination of those existing doctrines
and support for proposals to improve and update those principles
and remedies. However, the ALI skipped that step entirely, electing
instead to create a new family relationship status—domestic
partnership. As fun and exciting as social engineering may be, the
ALI must be faulted for rushing to propose a radical new domestic
relationship rather than first exploring the possibility that improving
existing doctrines might provide adequate or better protection
against economic unfairness resulting from the breakup of
nonmarital relationships.
1. Rejection of contract
The ALI’s disregard for existing legal doctrines goes further. For
example, chapter 6 rejects basing domestic partnership upon actual
contract, agreement, or intent. The Reporters for chapter 6 explicitly
declare: “This section thus does not require, as a predicate to finding
the existence of a domestic partnership, that the parties had an
implied or express agreement, or even that the facts meet the
standard requirements of a quantum meruit claim.”80 This is ironic
because the drafters of chapter 6 invoke contract principles to justify

79. For instance, they acknowledge that the unjust enrichment doctrine was successfully
used to allow recovery as in Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). PRINCIPLES
(Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03, Reporter’s Notes, at 41. There the jury awarded
a woman $113,000 on her claim of unjust enrichment; she and the defendant had lived
together for a dozen years, they had two children, and he had once executed a will that gave
her ten percent of his property. The jury awarded her a little more than ten percent of his net
worth at the end of the relationship under the equitable doctrine. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303.
80. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
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legalization of domestic partnership by operation of law.81 Yet they
set the ordinary contract principle on its head. Contract principles
protect individuals against being bound by obligations unless they
affirmatively opt in by accepting those obligations. The ALI,
however, proposes to bind individuals to a contract that they have
not made, to obligations they have not chosen to assume, to
commitments they have not agreed to assume, by the tactic of
putting the burden of the individuals to act affirmatively to opt out
or those obligations and commitments will be imposed by default.82
How will a couple opt out of the default domestic partnership
provisions of chapter 6? It appears that lawyers will be required to
help them do so. The “opt out” must be by express agreement. Such
agreements (as regulated by chapter 7 of the Family Dissolution
Principles, for example) are quite technical and subject to very
precise limitations, qualifications, and conditions. To provide reliable
protection, the couple seeking to avoid domestic partnership by
operation of law will need to obtain the services of an attorney—
indeed, they will probably require the services of two attorneys.83
Thus, most lower and middle income couples will not consider
opting out to be a realistic option for them. And higher income
couples who wish to opt out will have to pay dearly for the privilege,
as legal services do not come cheaply.
The Reporters propose to implement a set of default rules—in
effect, a contract imposed by law on parties who do not explicitly
express their agreement to some different set of rules.84 The default
position (and shifting the burden to opt out) might be justified if it
reflected social expectations, but that is not the case in this instance.
Most people who enter nonmarital cohabitation deliberately choose
not to assume the financial responsibilities of marriage that chapter 6
imposes on domestic partners.85 Chapter 6 assumes exactly the
81. See generally id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
82. Id. The ALI scheme is reminiscent of the tactic of vendors who send advertisements
offering one month’s free subscription (and in the fine print add that unless you affirmatively
opt out thereafter, they will continue to send you the product every month at an exorbitant
charge, which will continue until you affirmatively act to cancel the subscription); however,
unlike the ALI, those merchants do not impose the obligation on the buyers to affirmatively
opt out until after they have affirmatively indicated their choice to opt in (by returning the
postcard that says “I subscribe”).
83. Id. § 7.05(3)(b).
84. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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opposite. Thus, chapter 6 is ultimately anti-consent.
In one sense, chapter 6 proposes compulsory economic marriage.
It proposes to force the economic obligations of marriage upon all
persons who cohabit.86 It will impose upon virtually all cohabitants
(all who do not engage an attorney and execute a document that
explicitly opts out) the full economic obligations and duties of
marriage. It reflects the drafters’ strong policy preference for linking
economic obligations enforceable upon dissolution with
cohabitation. Ironically, this pro-marriage policy proposal of chapter
6 overshoots the mark because consent, agreement, and contract are
essential to marriage.87
2. Rejection of reasonable expectation
Chapter 6 also rejects reasonable expectation as the basis for
recovery as domestic partners. While it appears to assume (not
unreasonably) that cohabitation in a primary residence for a
significant period of time creates a reasonable expectation of some
economic interdependence, on close inspection it turns out that an
actual reasonable expectation to share in a marriage-like economic
relationship is not required to recover marriage-like property
interests and alimony rights, nor is lack of reasonable expectation to
share economic benefits a sufficient protection against an unexpected
claim under chapter 6. For example, one of the factors included in
the black letter law of section 6.03 as evidence that the parties are
domestic partners is participation in some “form of commitment
ceremony or registration as a domestic partnership that, under
applicable law, does not give rise to the rights and obligations” of
domestic partnership.88 Even if the parties investigated the law and
determined that going through a private commitment ceremony or
having their relationship blessed or solemnized in some religious
fashion would not give rise to any financial obligations to each other
(and based upon that understanding they proceeded) and even if the
86. See generally Press Release, Stephen Franks, New Zealand M.P., Government Moves
to Marry Thousands Today (May 4, 2000) (on file with author).
87. For similar objections to a New Zealand bill, see Press Release, Stephen Franks,
New Zealand M.P., Grim Year Ahead Likely for Many De Facto Couples (autodated) (on file
with author); Stephen Franks, New Zealand M.P., What’s the Fuss Over De Facto and Same
Sex Property Law? (June 18, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). While I
confess that I like the incentive to marry, I dislike the tactic.
88. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(j) (emphasis added).
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law of the state where that relationship was created or where the
parties resided explicitly provided that it did not give rise to
economic rights and obligations, under chapter 6 the ceremony
would be considered evidence of and could provide a basis for the
imposition of the very economic responsibilities of domestic partners
that the parties intended and reasonably expected to avoid.
The Reporters have categorically assumed that virtually all such
cohabiting couples (except those who explicitly and properly opt
out) wish to and in fact do “avoid the form of marriage even as they
enjoy its [economic] substance.”89 In fact, many people enter into
domestic partnerships because they wish to avoid marriage and
particularly to avoid the economic responsibilities and obligations of
marriage.90 Chapter 6 differs significantly from some other chapters
of the Principles because it does not require evidence of the intent or
reasonable expectations of the parties. By contrast, for example, one
only becomes a “de facto parent” upon a finding of evidence of a
reasonable expectation of the parental relationship (including
permission of the biological parent).91
The failure to protect reasonable expectations of separate
financial interests will surely harm some women because in some
cultures, especially in some minority ethnic communities, women do
most of the saving. For example, critics of a similar proposal in New
Zealand wrote:
What about the woman who has carefully saved a nest egg from her
useless boyfriend. She could see half of it go with him if she lets
him stay for over three years because she was lonely.
....
“This certainty of litigation will impose great costs on Maori solo
mothers and the legal aid system,” said Donna Awatere Huata.
In Maori society it is practically always women who do the saving.

89. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a.
90. See Fineman, supra note 76, at 325; see also Twila L. Perry, Dissolution Planning in
Family Law: A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look Toward the Future, 24 FAM. L.Q. 77,
91 (1990); Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr:
On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 921, 983–84 (1995).
91. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03(1)(c).
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This provides security for the children and herself when her partner
abandons his responsibilities.
Yet when this flawed legislation becomes law, Maori women will be
at great risk of losing half of their hard earned assets to the
absconding male.92

Since chapter 6 subordinates subjective expectations to strong
presumptions and pro-partnership principles, similar results would
occur under the ALI Principles as well.
Thus, chapter 6 goes far beyond Marvin v. Marvin,93 the seminal
California case famous for marking the extreme boundary of existing
“palimony” rules. Ultimately, the claimant in the Marvin case
(Michelle) was unable to recover on her claim because she failed to
establish any facts which would provide any reasonable expectation
of recovery under any legal or equitable principle or doctrine.94 The
Reporters for chapter 6, however, indicate that under chapter 6 a
strong “presumption arises” that Michelle would recover as a
domestic partner.95 Chapter 6 thus exceeds even the extreme Marvin
decision.
3. Rejection of “good faith belief ” requirement of the putative spouse
doctrine
Similarly, the rejection of the time-proven element of the
putative spouse doctrine that requires a good faith belief in the
validity of the marriage is very unwise. The Reporters explain that
“[k]nowledge that a domestic partner is married to another does not
alone bar claims under [Chapter 6].”96 Under the putative spouse
doctrine, the cohabitant who is living with someone who is married
to another cannot collect as a putative spouse unless he or she had a

92. Press Release, Stephen Franks & Donna Awatere Huata, New Zealand M.P.s, Select
Committee Scrutiny a Must (Feb 28, 2001) (on file with author).
93. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
94. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The court
found that Michelle failed to establish as a matter of fact that Lee Marvin had made any express
or implied agreement to divide his property with her or to be a financial partner with her or to
provide post-cohabitation support for her. It further found that Michelle had been richly
rewarded during cohabitation for her contributions to the relationship and concluded that Lee
had not been enriched neither materially nor unjustly.
95. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. d, illus. 6.
96. Id. § 6.01 cmt. d, at 7.
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good faith belief in the lawfulness of the purported marriage to the
putative spouse.97 The Reporters instead note: “By contrast, the basis
for the accrual of rights between the parties under this Chapter is the
character of their social relationship. Knowledge that one or both
parties are married to another person is not conceptually inconsistent
with the assertion of claims under this Chapter.”98 (This apparently
reflects Reporter Professor Ellman’s hostility to the notion of moral
accountability having any role to play in marital dissolution law in
America.)99
The reason for the “good faith belief” requirement of the
putative spouse doctrine is to protect the integrity of the monogamy
rule that one person may have only one spouse at one time.100 It
protects that rule by refusing to extend financial protections to
persons even who celebrate marriage if they have reason to believe
that they or their spouse is still married to someone else. Thus, the
ALI position refuses to protect the monogamy principle; indeed, it
flatly declares that monogamy is wholly irrelevant to any recovery. It
is merely “the character of their social relationship” that justifies their
being able to assert a claim. On the other hand, it was precisely “the
character of their social relationship”—bigamous, disfavored, and
contrary to public policy supporting monogamous marriage—that
was the principle underlying the good faith rule of the putative
spouse doctrine.
F. Chapter 6 Is Drafted Ambiguously, Abstractly, and Incompletely
In addition to the errors relating to deconstruction and leveling
of family relations, chapter 6 contains some significant practical and
drafting errors. It leaves too many essential questions unanswered.

97. Id.; see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed., 1988) (“The good faith of the party who asserts a claim based on
the marriage is required.”).
98. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Christopher L.
Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
99. See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic
Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2000); Ira Mark Ellman, The
Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801 (1999);
Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (1999).
100. See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 98, at 18–19; see also supra note 40 and
accompanying text (confusion over whether polygamists are covered under chapter 6).
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1. Chapter 6 fails to provide specific information essential for equitable
economic justice for cohabitants
As a matter of drafting, one of the weaknesses of chapter 6 is that
it recommends adopting rules that depend upon a specific time
variable to be fair, but then it refuses to recommend a specific time.
For example, in section 6 a rebuttable presumption of domestic
partnership arises if the parties “have maintained a common
household . . . for a continuous period that equals or exceeds a
duration, called the cohabitation period, set in a uniform rule of
statewide application.”101 The Reporters decline to suggest a specific
time for the cohabitation period (perhaps for tactical political
reasons). Likewise, an irrebuttable presumption of domestic
partnership arises if a couple “have maintained a common
household . . . with their common child . . . for a continuous period
that equals or exceeds a duration, called the cohabitation parenting
period, set in a uniform rule of statewide application.”102 Again, the
drafters fail to define how long that period should be. The omission
is not insignificant; in each case a legal presumption arises if, but only
if, the parties have cohabited for the undefined time period. Whether
or not it is wise, just, and fair to presume as a matter of law that a
domestic partnership has been established (and interdependent
financial obligations assumed) by cohabiting for a period of time
depends upon what period of time. For example, if the parties have
maintained a common household for twenty-one years, most people
would think it fair to impose financial obligations similar to domestic
partnership, but if they have only maintained a common household
for twenty-one days the general sentiment might be very different.
The problem with chapter 6 is that it does not identify what that
period should be—whether it should be long, extremely long, short,
or extremely short. That is ironic because the Reporters base their
argument for legalization of domestic partnership on the notion that
it is “just” and “fair” and “equitable.”103 To claim that fairness
101. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(3).
102. Id. § 6.03(2).
103. Id. § 6.02 & cmt. b. The Reporters also note:
[O]ne court [has] observed that it is appropriate in these cases to presume “that the
parties intend to deal fairly with each other.” This suggests that, as in marriage, in
the ordinary case the law should provide remedies at the dissolution of a domestic
relationship that will ensure an equitable allocation of accumulated property and of
the financial losses arising from the termination of the relationship . . . . [Chapter 6]
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mandates the change of law they propose and then retreat from one
of the most important factors that determine fairness—how long the
parties have lived together—undermines the justifying principle. It
also raises a concern that chapter 6 could be abused (or was
intended) to impose unfair economic obligations in a strict liability
way upon those who have shared a common household and life for
only a very short period of time.104
Likewise, chapter 6 wisely limits its application to the rights of
the parties upon the termination of the relationship. Third parties
cannot use the status to recover from a domestic partner. However,
the Reporters provide no principled basis for limiting the application
of their economic “fairness” principle in that way. For example, why
should long-time domestic partners not be able to sue negligent
drivers and employers for loss of consortium when short-time
spouses can recover? Why should the economic rights upon death be
different from the rights upon separation? While there are some
good answers to such questions, the Reporters give none of them.
By drawing lines without giving justifications for those limits, the
Reporters appear arbitrary and invite quick erosion of the lines they
have drawn. The failure to articulate any justification for not
extending the right to recover to third parties suggests that the
Reporters were not persuaded that there were any good reasons for
the limitation, that they favor erosion of the line they have drawn,
and that they have drawn the line solely for temporary, strategic
reasons of political expediency. It looks like a Trojan horse.
2. Chapter 6 is too abstract and invites litigation
Chapter 6 makes some distinctions that may make sense in the
abstract but are very difficult to apply in courtrooms and litigation.
For instance, the authors emphasize that even though their
definition of domestic partnership is extremely broad, it is not
intended to include persons who merely live in “group living
arrangements, such as dormitories or shared houses.”105 The
difference, the Reporters indicate, depends upon whether they are

shifts the burden of showing a contract to the party who wishes to avoid such
fairness-based remedies . . . .
Id. § 6.03 cmt. b, at 19.
104. Likewise, section 6.03(6) suffers from this flaw.
105. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. I, at 34.
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living in such arrangements “as an individual” rather than as a
“couple.”106 Conceptually that may be a coherent distinction, but at
the level of trial and proof, it is an extremely ambiguous distinction.
What about two individuals who live together in a house in an
ongoing sexual relationship, but they have their own separate
bedrooms? What if they share utility and food costs, but have
separate cars and separate bank accounts? What about couples who
share a bedroom, share sexual relations, are socially recognized as “a
couple” but keep all of their living expenses separate? What if sex is
not involved? The variations are innumerable and the litigation will
be interminable.107
Even in cases of relatively short cohabitation periods, subsections
6.03(6) and (7) leave the courthouse door open for parties to
establish domestic partnership. They invite couples who break up
before the minimum period of time to litigate anyway. And they
make the invitation even more attractive by creating a laundry list of
thirteen factors that can help them prove their claim of domestic
partnership despite the short period of time they lived together.
Thus, chapter 6 invites litigation. In fact, it requires legal services
twice. First, in order to avoid application of chapter 6, parties
cohabiting or intending to cohabit will need to obtain legal services
to draft an agreement that their relationship not be governed by
chapter 6.108 Because of the ambiguities of the chapter, it is virtually
certain that only professionally prepared agreements will be
sufficient; such vague drafting guarantees employment for two
lawyers at the outset of the relationship. Second, because section
6.03 is so broad and so inviting, it encourages less wealthy or
dissatisfied parties to file domestic partner claims upon the breakup
of the relationship. Again, legal services (of two attorneys) are
required. Whatever the result, the lawyers win, as do the courts who
have more work for (more) judges. Only the parties (at least one of
them) will lose.
Some provisions of chapter 6 are tautological. For example,
whether unrelated persons are family (domestic partners) depends in
part upon whether they “share a primary residence,”109 with “family

106.
107.
108.
109.
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PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(1), (4).

13WARD.DOC

1189]

12/5/01 5:08 AM

Deconstructing Family

members.” Whether the people they live with are “family members”
may depend upon whether they are “domestic partners.”110
The noble experiment proposed by chapter 6 is not entirely
dissimilar to Utah’s recent experience with common law marriage.
The Utah Legislature enacted a statute approximately one decade
ago creating common law marriage.111 It was based, like chapter 6,
on an economic fairness concern—it was enacted to eliminate welfare
fraud.112 Since then, however, common law marriage claims have
plagued the courts, and none of them has arisen in the context
targeted by the legislature—welfare fraud. There have been
tremendous proof problems, interpretation issues, and judicial calls
for reconsideration of the legislation.113 This is similar to the
experience that led many other states (approximately forty) to
abolish common law marriage. The problems that have led to the
rejection of common law marriage are unavoidable under chapter 6
in claims for domestic partnership.
3. Chapter 6 creates very serious conflict of laws questions that have not
been examined
Because of loose drafting, a very serious conflict of laws question
is raised by section 6.03(7)(j), which explicitly authorizes the court
to disregard otherwise applicable law. If the parties have participated
in the commitment ceremony and registered as domestic partners in
a state where that ceremony or registration “does not give rise to the
rights and obligations established by this Chapter,”114 section
6.03(7)(j) provides that a court hearing a domestic partnership claim
may rely on the fact of such ceremony or registration to impose the
financial rights and obligations of domestic partnership anyway. The
other state’s law may be completely disregarded. The Reporters
provide no qualification, condition, or limit to this factor. Vested

110. Id. § 6.03(4).
111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (2000) (enacted in 1987).
112. Because couples who were married and applied for welfare had to count all of the
income of both of the parties, but persons who were cohabiting and applied for welfare
apparently did not have to include the income of their nonmarital cohabitants, the legislature
enacted common law marriage to prevent “welfare fraud.” See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1
P.3d 1074, 1078 (Utah 2000); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 182–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
113. Kelley, 9 P.3d at 182–84 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
114. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(j).
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rights and protections created by other law (the right to protection
against economic obligations and the right to keep one’s own
property and earnings) are to be ignored categorically, even if that
other state has the most significant relationship with the parties and
the relationship. This is apparently true even if the forum state does
not have any significant relationship at all with the parties or their
co-residence, which could violate the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit clauses of the Constitution.115
The same problems arise with respect to section 6.03(7)(k),
where the fact that parties have participated in “a void or voidable
marriage that, under applicable law, does not give rise to the
economic incidents of marriage”116 may be the basis for the
imposition of the economic incidents of marriage under chapter 6.
Again, this appears to be true even if the forum state has no
significant interest in applying its law and even if the only state that
has an interest in applying its law is the other state in which the
couple resided exclusively and created their relationship.
The choice of law issues are not insubstantial in quantitative
terms, either. As of January 1, 2001, seventy-seven percent of the
same-sex couples who had registered “civil unions” under the new
Vermont law allowing same-sex couples to acquire that new legal
status were from outside of Vermont.117 Gay or lesbian couples from
forty-seven states have registered civil unions in Vermont. The status
recognition and choice of law issues that will attend efforts to force
other states to recognize the domestic partnership status and give
legal benefits to domestic partnerships under chapter 6, likewise, are
not merely idle academic concerns.
G. It Is Contrary to the Best Interests of Society to Legalize Same-Sex
Domestic Partnerships and to Legitimize and Promote Nonmarital
Cohabitation as Chapter 6 Does
The good intentions or objectives noted in Part II are not the
115. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (concluding that Constitution
is violated if jurisdiction whose law is applied has no significant contacts with the parties to
transaction); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (finding that due process was
violated when applied Texas law to parties and accident in Mexico, where there were no
contacts with Texas).
116. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(7)(k).
117. E-mail from Bill Apao, Vt. Dep’t of Health, forwarded to Lynn D. Wardle, the
author of this article, by Wendy Herdlein (Feb. 14, 2001) (on file with author).

1222

13WARD.DOC

1189]

12/5/01 5:08 AM

Deconstructing Family

only goals of chapter 6, but ultimately seem to attract support for a
much more radical ideological agenda—including legalization of
same-sex domestic partnerships. Chapter 6 generally legalizes samesex domestic partnerships, a step that has been repeatedly rejected by
the voters of the American states. It also legitimizes and provides
significant financial incentives to heterosexual couples to enter into
nonmarital cohabitation, which can be clearly detrimental to the
parties who cohabit, to their children, and to society.
1. Chapter 6 extends to same-sex couples a legal status (domestic
partnership) that is fully equivalent to marriage in terms of the
economic status, rights, and duties of the parties inter se upon breakup
of the relationship
In some respects, chapter 6 seems designed primarily to extend
to same-sex couples a legal status (domestic partnership) that is fully
equivalent to marriage in terms of the economic status, rights, and
duties of the parties inter se upon breakup of the relationship. The
black letter provisions and the Reporters’ comments explicitly and
repeatedly emphasize that same-sex couples are included in chapter 6
domestic partnerships.118 While chapter 6 thwarts the expectations
and understandings of most heterosexual nonmarital cohabitants
(that cohabitation does not entail marriage-like economic
commitment), it fulfills the frustrated yearnings of the gay and
lesbian community for some marriage-like legal status for same-sex
relationships.119
Only one state (Vermont) gives general domestic partnership
status to same-sex couples, and one other (Hawaii) does so
restrictively.120 Yet the ALI has clearly designed chapter 6 to endorse

118. The Reporters cite with approval the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v.
Lewin (and Baehr v. Miicke) (later overturned by a constitutional amendment passed
overwhelmingly by more than two-thirds of the citizens of Hawaii). They similarly cite with
approval the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. State and the legalization of samesex civil unions there. The commentary and notes emphasize that same-sex couples are eligible
for domestic partnership status and that moral (public policy) concerns relating to sexual
behavior ought to be excluded from consideration in determining financial obligations and
interests between nonmarital domestic partners. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4),
supra note 1, § 6.01(1); id. § 6.03(1) & cmts. b, d & illus. 7–9; id. Reporter’s Notes, at 39,
46–49.
119. See generally id. § 6.03 Reporter’s Notes, at 39, 46–49.
120. Vermont has created a scheme of “Civil Union” registrations allowing same-sex
couples to obtain marital property and alimony benefits similar to those provided by chapter 6
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and promote same-sex domestic partnership. That is out of step with
the position taken by the people of every state that have had the
chance to vote on the question of whether state laws should extend
to same-sex couples the same or equivalent status enjoyed in law by
married heterosexual couples.121 Same-sex domestic partnership is
clearly a step toward same-sex marriage. Chapter 6 clearly proposes
to take that initial step.
2. There are compelling public interest reasons not to legitimate
heterosexual nonmarital cohabitation
The Reporters provide a rose-colored view of why people enter
domestic partnership rather than getting married. Indeed they
describe noble nonmarital cohabitation in glowing terms.122
However, empirical research has been done in the past twenty years
on nonmarital cohabitation, and the picture that emerges of those
relationships is not appealing. One of the most complete
compilations of data on outcomes of nonmarital cohabitation in the
United States, done by David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, found that “virtually all research on the topic has
determined that the chances of divorce ending a marriage preceded
by cohabitation are significantly greater than for a marriage not
preceded by cohabitation.”123 Likewise, “[a]ccording to recent
studies cohabitants tend not to be as committed as married couples
in their dedication to the continuation of the relationship . . . , and
they are more oriented toward their own personal autonomy.”124
“Most cohabiting relationships are relatively short lived . . . . In

by pre-registration. Hawaii allows registration for limited benefits as “reciprocal beneficiaries.”
When Hawaii’s domestic partner benefit law passed, state officials predicted that 20,000 people
would sign up, but by the end of 1997, fewer than 300 had signed up. David Albertson,
Hawaii’s Domestic Partners Benefit Law Serves Few but Saves Precedent for Others, EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT NEWS, Apr. 1, 1998.
121. In Hawaii, Alaska, California, Nevada, and Nebraska, voters have resoundingly
preserved the unique status, benefits, and protections of marriage for male-female couples.
122. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02; id. § 6.03 & cmt. a;
id. Reporter’s Notes, at 36–39. Quotes from the Reporter’s Notes may be of interest to
readers here.
123. DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE NATIONAL MARRIAGE
PROJECT, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER? WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
COHABITATION BEFORE MARRIAGE 4 (1999), available at http://www.smartmarriages.com/cohabit.html (last visited June 12, 1999).
124. Id. at 5.
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general, cohabiting relationships tend to be less satisfactory than
marriage relationships.”125
Annual rates of depression among cohabiting couples are more
than three times what they are among married couples. And
women in cohabiting relationships are more likely than married
women to suffer physical and sexual abuse. Some research has
shown that aggression is at least twice as common among
cohabitors as it is among married partners.126

Linda Waite’s review of the National Survey of Families and
Households data revealed that when cohabiting couples argue they
are more than three times as likely to resort to physical violence than
are married couples, a finding supported by several other studies.127
Studies also indicate that with cohabiting couples there are “far
higher levels of child abuse than is found in intact families.”128 Child
sexual abuse is much higher for children whose biological parent or
parents are only cohabiting rather than married.129 “[T]hree quarters
of children born to cohabiting parents will see their parents split up
before they reach age sixteen, whereas only about a third of children
born to married parents face a similar fate.”130 Likewise, “[w]hile the
1996 poverty rate for children living in married couple households
was about 6%, it was 31% for children living in cohabiting
households.”131 Another study notes that cohabiting men are four

125. Id. at 6. Popenoe and Whitehead note the 1980s data showing that about sixty
percent of cohabitants married. Id. In the 1990s, however, that rate of cohabitant marriage fell
to about thirty-five percent. Forste, supra note 74.
126. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 7.
127. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 155; see also POPENOE & WHITEHEAD,
supra note 123, at 7 (“[A]ggression is at least twice as common among cohabitors as it is
among married partners.”); Faith Abbott, No Bomb, No Book, 24 HUM. LIFE REV. 31, 43
(1998) (citing a 1993 British study by the Family Education Trust that used data on
documented cases of child abuse and neglect between 1982 and 1988 and “found that—
compared with a stable nuclear family—the incidence of abuse was thirty-three times higher
when the mother was living with a boyfriend not related to the child. And even when the livein boyfriend was the biological father of the children, the chances of abuse were still twenty
times more likely.”); Dean M. Busby, Violence in the Family, in 1 FAMILY RESEARCH, A 60YEAR REVIEW, 1930–1990 335, 361 (Steven J. Bahr ed., 1991) (“Yllo and Straus (1981) . . .
found that cohabiting couples had higher rates of violence than married couples. Severe
violence was almost five times as likely in cohabitating relationships [than in marriages].”).
128. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 8.
129. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 159.
130. POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 123, at 7.
131. Id. at 8.
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times more likely than husbands to cheat on their partners, and
cohabiting women are eight times more likely than wives to be
unfaithful to their partners.132 A recent study of the relationship of
marital status and individual happiness reported that a strong positive
relationship between marital status and personal happiness exists in
sixteen of the seventeen nations examined.133 The report found that
being married increased happiness equally for men and for women in
the nations examined, and marriage was more than three times more
closely associated with happiness than was nonmarital cohabitation.
In light of evidence like this, it is simply irrational for the ALI to
recommend in chapter 6 that states should legitimate nonmarital
cohabitation and give it the strong endorsement of providing posttermination economic consequences equivalent to those provided to
married parties.
H. Chapter 6 Would Significantly Weaken the Institution of Marriage
Legalizing domestic partnership as proposed by chapter 6 could
significantly weaken marriage. The overwhelming majority of young
people today yearn to get married,134 yet they are also frightened of
marriage because they have personally experienced or witnessed
repeatedly in the lives of their loved ones and friends the personal
trauma of marital failure and divorce. These vulnerable young people
may be drawn to the dangerous alternative of nonmarital domestic
partnership if it is legalized.
Despite the Reporters’ assurances that chapter 6 will not
encourage young people to enter into nonmarital cohabitation,135
there are good reasons to believe that if chapter 6 were adopted
more couples would choose nonmarital cohabitation instead of
marriage. For example, nonmarital cohabitation increased
dramatically after the famous Marvin v. Marvin case and similar
“palimony” cases in courts in other states in the 1970s and early
1980s. Between 1970 (just six years before Marvin) and 1999 (just
132. The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles, at http://www.marriagemovement.org (June 29, 2000).
133. Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation
Study, 60 J. MARR. & FAM. 527 (1998).
134. Waite and Gallagher report that “[n]inety-four percent of college freshmen in one
1997 survey said they personally hoped to get married. Just 3 percent didn’t hope to marry.”
WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 71, at 183.
135. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. b.
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twenty-three years after Marvin) the number of unmarried
heterosexual couples living together rose more than 800 percent.136
During the same time period, the rate of marriage fell dramatically.137
While cause and effect relations between legal changes and social
changes are hard to pin down exactly, at least it can be reasonably
said that there might be some causal connection.
Scandinavian countries have had heterosexual domestic
partnership for nearly a half century and have recognized same-sex
domestic partnership for about a dozen years. The experience of
those countries also suggests that legalizing domestic partnership will
weaken marriage. First, it appears that the legalization of domestic
partnership only occurs after the institution of marriage has already
been significantly weakened and devalued in society. Thus, the fact
that the ALI is proposing legalization of domestic partnership is a
significant indication that the institution of marriage in the United
States is already in distress in terms of loss of social position and
vitality. Second, after domestic partnership is legalized, it appears
that the institution of marriage rarely recovers its position in society.
The demographer William Goode suggests that after marriage is
weakened in a society it is nearly impossible to revitalize it without
some traumatic and dramatic external pressure such as military
conquest, economic collapse, or natural disaster of widespread
proportions.138 It is very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.
So before starting down the road to domestic partnership, we had
better be very sure that it leads in a direction we want to go—for
history suggests that it is a one-way street.

136. Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000 (U.S. DePart of Commerce,
Economics, and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at 55, Table No. 60 [hereinafter
Statistical Abstract 2000] (from 1,589 in 1980 to 4,486 in 1999); id. at 52, Table No. 57
(41.1% of women 15–44 in 1995 had cohabitated); id. at 51, Table No. 53 (24.1% of
population in 1980 never married; 29.0% in 1999); Statistical Abstract of the United States
1995 (U.S. DePart of Commerce, Economics, and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at
55, Table No. 60 (523,000 cohabitants in 1970).
137. Statistical Abstract 2000 at 51, Table No. 53 (from 65.5% in 1980 to 59.5% in
1999); Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977 (U.S. DePart of Commerce, Economics,
and Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau) at 38, Table No. 48 (married population 71.7% in
1970, 69.6% in 1976).
138. WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 318, 335–36
(1993).
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IV. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS IS A
PERSISTENT THEME OF THE ALI PRINCIPLES
Chapter 6 is not the only chapter of the Family Dissolution
Principles containing provisions that are hostile to marriage and
marriage-based families. That ideological bias tilts most of the
chapters of the Principles. For example, the Principles purport to
consider comprehensively the subject of “family dissolution,”139 but
the ALI totally refused to consider grounds for dissolution—that
topic was not even on the table.140 Since there is a well-recognized,
growing national movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorces,141
the omission is neither inadvertent nor nonpolitical. The Reporters
apparently were so committed to unilateral no-fault divorce that they
would not risk allowing that subject to come up for discussion.142
The provisions of chapter 2 of the Principles, dealing with the
allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibilities for
children, deconstruct legal parenthood just like chapter 6
deconstructs marriage by increasing the categories of persons who
can claim that privileged status and position. Chapter 2 extends
significant parental status, standing, rights, privileges, and
protections to adults who are not biological, adoptive, or marital
parents (the traditional categories of legal parents). Section 2.03
extends parental rights to “parents by estoppel,” and “de facto
parents,” as well as “legal parents.” The chapter 2 provisions also
give standing not only to those three groups of people, but allow
intervention by other interested persons who may not come within

139. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS, 1–16 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I)].
140. This harmonizes with the philosophy of chapter 6, which effectively allows the
unilateral creation of the domestic partnership status whenever either cohabiting party wants to
create it. Established unilateral no-fault divorce principles, which the Reporters protected
against reform, provide for the termination of the marital status relationship any time either
party wants to end it.
141. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and
Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783 (1999).
142. This should come as no surprise for anyone who has read the law review writings of
Ira Mark Ellman, the lead Reporter for the Family Dissolution Principles, who is an emphatic
defender of unilateral no-fault divorce. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive
Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L
J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 216 (1997); see also supra note 99.
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any of those categories.143 Child custody and visitation disputes will
have the potential to become community free-for-alls. (This is taking
the “it takes a village to raise a child” metaphor to a ludicrous
extreme.) Other sections of chapter 2 provide that sexual orientation
(which the comments suggest includes ongoing homosexual
behavior) of the contestants may not even be considered in resolving
custody issues.144 The comments categorically (and erroneously)
proclaim, with eyes closed to numerous studies to the contrary, that
there is no evidence that homosexuality of a parent harms or
jeopardizes children raised by such parents.145 Infidelity by one
contestant may not be considered in the custody proceeding unless
the faithful parent carries the expensive burden of establishing
(usually by hiring a child psychiatrist or psychologist) that the
infidelity has been harmful to the child (rather than the unfaithful
parent bearing the burden of showing no harm from the
infidelity).146
One of the major effects of the substantially expanded notion of
parenthood under chapter 2 of the Principles are that the lesbian
partner of a biological mother will be able to assert parental rights
and continue to interfere in the parent-child relationship of the
biological mother and child. Moreover, chapter 2 provides a basis for
manipulation to continue such relationships—the nonmarital
cohabitant being able to make a very credible threat to a biological
parent that “if you don’t stay with me, I will sue for and get custody
of your child, and you’ll be left without a partner and without a
child.”147 Those kinds of claims, which can be very threatening and

143. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.04.
144. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 139, § 2.14(1)(d).
145. See, e.g., ROBERT K. LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, NO
BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON’T TELL US ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING (2001); Judith
Stacey & Timothy Biblars, How Does Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOC. REV.
159 (2001); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997).
146. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 139, § 2.14(1)(e).
147. A few years ago I was consulted by a lawyer who was handling precisely that kind of
case. A young woman who had a child in a relationship with a man that went sour moved in
with an older woman who was a lesbian and who was financially well off. The young mother
and her child were supported for a relatively short period of time by the older lesbian. Then
the mother decided that she did not want to continue that relationship and moved out. She
allowed continued contact between her former partner and her child for a short period of time
but then determined that it was not in the best interests of her child to allow further contact by
the lesbian ex-partner. The lesbian ex-partner filed suit to obtain parental relations (visitation).
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disruptive to the child and to the mother-child relationship, will
surely proliferate (as will litigation to enforce them) if chapter 2 is
adopted.
Chapter 5 of the Family Dissolution Principles effects a
substantial revision of the basic principles of post-divorce alimony or
spousal support, which the ALI relabels “compensatory payments.”
The proposed provisions embody a radical change of alimony
principles, based in large part on the gender-discriminatory principle
that the spouse who earns the most generally should have a postdivorce duty to share income with the other spouse even if the other
spouse is self-supporting.148 Economic loss is the governing
consideration, but causal connection between marriage and loss is
not required.149 Equalization of post-divorce income solely for the
sake of gender-income equalization is as unjust as it is popular with
radical feminists.150 In determining compensatory payments, the
grounds or reasons for the failure and breakup of the marriage
generally are irrelevant; “fault” is not a valid consideration with
regard to compensatory payments (except behavior, such as spouse
abuse or child abuse, generally—and erroneously—attributed
predominantly to males).151
The provisions of chapter 7 on antenuptial contracts would
reverse the trend of the past four decades of generally respecting
party autonomy to structure the financial dimensions of spousal (and
imitative) relationships. Chapter 7 is generally hostile to enforcement
of premarital (and pre-nonmarital) agreements. For instance, chapter
7 requires agreement thirty days prior to marriage, and even if all of
the strict requirements are met, the burden of proof is on the party
seeking to enforce the contract to establish that it was not invalid.152

She won a temporary order of visitation.
148. There is conceptual harmony between the unilateralism of chapter 6 and of chapter
5. Chapter 6 effectively provides for the creation of the economic relationship of domestic
partnership any time either cohabiting party wants to create it. Chapter 5 effectively continues
the economic relationship (spousal support) after the dissolution of a marital relationship as
long as the economic “losing” party wants it.
149. See generally PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I), supra note 7, § 5.02(1) &
(2) & cmts. a, e; id. Reporter’s Notes, at 265, 269–71.
150. Id. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475 n.
40 (1999); Ellman, supra note 99; Michelle Murphy, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in
Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (2000).
151. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, Part I), supra note 7, § 5.02(2) & cmt. c.
152. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.05.
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Other provisions also provide that if a child is born after the party
signed the antenuptial contract or if the relationship lasts a certain
number of years before breakup, the court has the discretion to
decline to enforce the antenuptial contract on vague and subjective
“substantial injustice” grounds.153
The deconstruction of marriage is promoted in chapter 7. For
example, section 7.12 forbids enforcement of “covenant marriage”
agreements and other reinforced marriage commitments.154 Likewise,
Professor Ellman’s views against any principles of moral
responsibility in dissolution law are manifest in this chapter.155
Provisions in agreements that require consideration of marital
misconduct in awarding property or alimony are unenforceable.156
Thus, the attempt to deconstruct marriage and families is pervasive
throughout the ALI Principles.
Apart from ideologically driven flaws in the Principles there are a
number of gaps in the coverage of the project. For example, the
Family Dissolution Principles fail to discuss, much less recommend,
any procedural reforms for dissolution proceedings that might
ameliorate some of the trauma associated with such proceedings and
the breakup of families. Mediation, other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, waiting periods, counseling, and other practical methods
of providing protection against damaging, hasty, ill-considered
action, and against hostile and abusive tactics are not generally
considered or proposed in the Family Dissolution Principles. The
absence of provisions dealing with jurisdiction for dissolution
(divorce) and related proceedings is a serious disappointment.
Jurisdictional issues relating to divorce proceedings have not been
seriously considered in fifty years,157 yet much has changed in other
branches of the law of jurisdiction (including due process principles)
during that time. Likewise, as Ralph Whitten points out in his
paper,158 there are significant issues relating to conflicts of laws raised
153. Id. § 7.07.
154. “A term in an agreement is not enforceable if it (1) limits . . . the grounds for
divorce . . . .” Id. § 7.12. Likewise, penalties for filing for dissolution are unenforceable. Id. §
7.12(3).
155. See supra notes 99 & 142.
156. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.12(2).
157. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Williams v. North Carolina (II),
325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
158. Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-ofLaws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 1235.
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by the Principles, and family law would have been well served by a
systematic consideration of the choice of law and judgment
recognition dimensions of dissolution, custody, support, and marital
property division decrees. Regrettably, those topics were simply
ignored in the ALI Family Dissolution Principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The major flaw in the Family Dissolution Principles in general,
and chapter 6 in particular, is that it deconstructs family relations and
tries to “level” marriage, parenting, and “alternative” relationships
by greatly expanding the kinds of relationships that are given the
same preferred, privileged legal status and benefits as “family”
relations. Some aspects of that theme pervade nearly all of the
chapters of the Family Dissolution Principles, but it is in chapter 6
that this theme is expressed most clearly and perhaps most
dangerously. There, a new concubinage status called “domestic
partnership” is created and defined overbroadly, ridiculously easy
establishment of the new status is provided for, and based upon that
status the same economic rights and obligations accorded married
persons are extended to nonmarital cohabitants upon dissolution.
Due to ambiguous yet strategic drafting, a host of practical problems
can be expected if chapter 6 becomes law. A few of the provisions
reflect good intentions, if not good ideas, but they are so
intellectualized and so ambiguous that they are practically incapable
of nonarbitrary application. Rather than settling the law, chapter 6
and significant other parts of the Family Dissolution Principles are
likely to unsettle the law and generate increased litigation.
The potentially profound social effects of conferring legal
equivalence upon alternative relationships has not been wisely
considered by the ALI Principles. Chapter 6 relies on what the ALI
Reporters perceive to be recent social changes to justify a significant
revision of the basic institution of marriage and family life.159 It is far
from clear, however, that the drafters have not mistaken a mere
temporary lifestyle fad for a significant social change, confusing a
flashy but transitory generational blip in a few demographic cohorts
for real lasting social change. Nothing could be more common; every
generation sees its time as a time of pivotal social change and

159. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 cmt. a.
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perceives its fads as constituting great political progress and social
reformation. But after a few brief decades, after a few natural
calamities, a few wars, a few years of economic troubles, the fads fade
and the vaunted new lifestyles wilt and largely disappear. In the
meantime, however, large numbers of the affected generation will
suffer from the tragic (and unnecessary) deprivation and
impoverishment of their family life wrought by social engineers
whose devaluation of marriage and marriage-based families facilitated
and encouraged couples and families to discard the only solid
foundation for secure family relations in order to pursue shabby
counterfeit “functional equivalents” like domestic partnership.
The ALI Principles achieve plausible coherence only by
dismissing the powerful bonds of marriage and parenthood as
subjective, artificial social constructs. It is based firmly on the
principle of moral relativism that equates homosexual partners and
nonmarital cohabitation with marriage, that deems a lesbian’s
friendship with the child of another woman as the equivalent of
maternal love, that equates a roommate’s desire for influence over a
child or children with parental responsibility. It insists that marital
love between husband and wife is no different from any intimate
relationship that results from cohabitation by consenting adults.
Thus, significant portions of the Family Dissolution Principles are
mere ideology masquerading as policy—liberal dogma passed off as
legal principle. Chapter 6 virtually ignores the entire body of social
science research about the characteristics of nonmarital cohabitation
as well as the profound lessons about those human relationships
taught by history, tradition, and human experience that might
inform a responsible law reform initiative. Rather, it reflects a terribly
impoverished view of marriage and marriage-based family life that
borders on cynicism and despair.
The Family Dissolution Principles in general, and chapter 6 in
particular, represent a squandered opportunity for the ALI. The time
is ripe for dissolution law reform. There have been no comprehensive
proposals for reform of dissolution law in America since the UMDA
was proposed in 1970. The UMDA was a pre-no-fault divorce
reform and its major contribution to family law was to endorse and
show how to implement no-fault divorce. Since the UMDA was
proposed, a no-fault divorce revolution has swept the country, and
the states have had a quarter-century of experience with no-fault
divorce. A generation has grown up since the no-fault divorce
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revolution and the UMDA. The world has changed much since then,
and much more is known today about divorce consequences (for
children and adults) and processes than was known then. The dreams
of sexual liberation and freedom from family commitments that
seemed so attractive to the free-spirit generation of the 1960s and
1970s seem much less glamorous to the current generation who
were the children of or grew up in the era of no-fault divorce. A
number of unexpected and undesirable consequences of the no-fault
divorce reforms of the 1970s have been identified, and the public
dissatisfaction with the regime of unilateral no-fault divorce and with
adversary custody and visitation litigation is growing. Thus, the time
is right for a comprehensive review of and proposal for reform of
dissolution law in the United States, but the ALI has fumbled the
opportunity by seeking to radically deconstruct the family and
equalize alternative relations. So the opportunity to responsibly
guide the reform of family dissolution law in America remains, and
some other organizations and individuals may now step forward,
profiting from the mistakes of the ALI, to offer more practical,
prudent, reasonable, responsible, and well-tailored law reform
proposals.
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